Before the Iraq War invasion, many military observers and government officials had expected a lengthy campaign of aerial bombing by the U.S. before any ground action would take place. This was based on using the 1991 Persian Gulf War as an example or the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. But other U.S. plans envisioned simultaneous air and ground assaults to decapitate the Iraqi forces quickly (the tactic of shock and awe). It was an attempt to bypass Iraqi military units and cities in most cases which involved hostilities.

There was an assumption that superior mobility and coordination of Coalition forces would allow them to attack the heart of the Iraqi command structure and destroy it in a short time. This would minimize civilian deaths and damage to infrastructure. It was expected that the elimination of the Iraqi leadership would lead to the collapse of the Iraqi Forces and the government.

So shock and awe (technically known as rapid dominance) was used in the Iraq War. As a military doctrine based on the use of overwhelming power and spectacular displays of force to paralyze the enemy's perception of the battlefield and destroy its will to fight, the tactic had success. This doctrine which was written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in 1996 allowed the United States to meet key goals against Iraq. But overall not every U.S. goal was met.

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